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“There is nothing new except what is forgotten.” 
Mlle. Rose Bertin 
 
 The financial press has often characterized the 2007-2008 United States subprime 
mess as a new breed of crisis.  Indeed, this view often points to the international 
repercussions of the U.S.-based crisis as evidence that the globalization of financial 
portfolios has introduced new channels for spillovers that were never present before.  At 
present, there is also considerable confusion in academic and policy circles as to whether 
the shaky predicament of the global economy owes to contagion or to shared (common) 
economic fundamentals. I address these issues, in turn, and discuss some of the questions, 
as regards regulation of financial institutions, that the current crisis has raised. 
 
Financial Crisis: the setting 
Across countries and over the centuries, economic crises of all type follow a 
similar pattern.1  An innovation emerges.  Sometimes it is a new tool of science of 
industry, such as the diving bell, steam engine, or the radio.  Sometime it is a tool of 
financial engineering, such as the joint-stock company, junk bonds, or collateralized debt 
obligations.  Investors may be wary at first, but then they see that extraordinary returns 
appear available on these new instruments and they rush in.  Financial intermediaries—
                                                 
1 Michael D. Bordo ( 2007), “The Crisis of 2007: The Same Old Story Only the Players have Changed”. At 
Michael Bordo’s webpage. 
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banks and investment companies—stretch their balance sheets so as not to be left out. 
The upward surge in asset prices continues, and that generation of financial market 
participants concludes that rules have been rewritten: Risk has been tamed, and leverage 
is always rewarded.  All too often, policy makers assert that the asset-price boom is a 
vote of confidence on their regime—that “this time is different”. Only seldom, to my 
knowledge, do they protest that perhaps the world has not changed and that the old rules 
of valuation still apply.  
But the old rules do apply. The asset price rise peters out, sometimes from 
exhaustion on its own or sometimes because of a real shock to the economy. This exposes 
the weaknesses of the balance sheets of those who justified high leverage by the 
expectation of outsized capital gains. Many financial firms admit losses, and some 
ultimately fail. All those financial firms hunker down, constricting credit availability in 
an effort to slim their balance sheets. With wealth lower and credit harder to get, 
economic activity typically contracts. Only after the losses are flushed out of the financial 
system and often with the encouragement of lagging monetary and fiscal ease does the 
economy recover. 
The role of the real estate market 
This sorry spectacle repeats itself in the various types of crises, but the most 
relevant to the present situation is the aftermath of banking crises. In recent work with 
Kenneth Rogoff, I documented eighteen such episodes in industrial economies over the 
past thirty years. 2 3  Declines in assets, including those of both houses and equities that 
                                                 
2 Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff (2008), “Is The 2007 U.S. Subprime Crisis So Different? An 
International Historical Comparison,” forthcoming in American Economic Review, May. 
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the United States has experienced over the past year, are common markers of the onset of 
banking crises. In the worst five banking crises (The Big Five) in industrial countries over 
the past thirty years, the value of houses fell about 25 percent on average from their peak 
(Figure 1) 
Figure 1:  Real Housing Prices and Banking Crises
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Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) and sources cited therein. 
The fallout of banking crises 
                                                                                                                                                 
3 The Five Big Five Crises:  Spain (1977), Norway (1987), Finland (1991),Sweden (1991) and 
Japan (1992), where the starting year is in parenthesis. 
Other Banking and Financial Crises:  Australia (1989), Canada (1983), Denmark (1987), France 
(1994), Germany (1977), Greece (1991), Iceland (1985), and Italy (1990),  and New Zealand 
(1987), United Kingdom (1974, 1991, 1995), and United States (1984). 
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The cautionary lesson for today’s situation in the United States is that the decline in 
output after a banking crisis is both large and protracted (Figure 2). The average drop in 
(real per capita) output growth is over 2 percent, and it typically takes two years to return 
to trend. For the five most catastrophic cases, the drop in annual output growth from peak 
to trough is over 5 percent, and growth remained well below precrisis trend even after 
three years.  
Figure 2:  Real GDP Growth per Capita and Banking Crises
 (PPP basis)
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Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) and sources cited therein. 
The international repercussions of the U.S. crisis: contagion or confusion?  
Swift international spillovers are not a new phenomenon.  In this regard, the panic 
of 1907, which began in the United States and quickly spread to other advanced 
economies (particularly, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, and Sweden), serves as an 
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illustrative historical benchmark for modern-day financial contagion. 4 Like in the present 
episode, emerging markets were mostly spared in 1907; the only casualty in that episode 
was Mexico. 
 There is little doubt that the U.S. crisis has spilled over into other markets. Two 
major advanced economies, Japan and Germany, have been singled out by the financial 
press as being particularly hard-hit by the crisis in the United States. There is no denying 
that German and Japanese financial institutions sought more attractive returns in the U.S. 
subprime market, perhaps owing to the fact that profit opportunites in domestic real estate 
were limited at best and dismal at worst (Figure 3).  Indeed, after the fact, it has become 
evident that financial institutions in these countries had nontrivial exposure to the U.S. 
sub-prime market.5  This is a classic channel of transmission or contagion, through which 
a crisis in one country spreads across international borders.  In the present context, 
however, contagion or spillovers are only a part of the story 
If other countries are experiencing economic difficulties at the same time as the 
United States, it importantly owes to the fact that many of the features that characterized 
the run-up to the subprime crisis in the U.S. were also present in many other advanced 
economies. Specifically, many countries in Europe and elsewhere (New Zealand, for 
example) were having their own home-grown real estate bubbles (Figure 3).  This, in and 
of itself makes, these countries vulnerable to the usual nasty consequences of asset 
market crashes—irrespective of what may be happening in the United States. This cannot 
be pinned on the U. S. subprime fiasco or on contagion. The odds of a correction were 
                                                 
4 See , Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). 
5 Owing to the opaqueness of balance sheets in many of these financial institutions in these countries the 
full extent of exposure is, as yet, unknown. 
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already present.  
Figure 3. Percent Change in Real Housing Prices: 2002-2006
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Sources: Shiller, and Bank of International Settlements. 
Policy Lessons: the banana republic approach to banking supervision 
As Venezuela’s worst banking crisis unfolded in 1994-1995 (conservative 
estimates of the bailout costs of that crisis are at around 18 percent of GDP), no one in 
that country seemed to know whose responsibility it was to supervise the financial 
institutions.  As is usual in most banking crises, lending standards had become lax, there 
was interconnected lending, and there was plenty of plain old-fashioned graft.  The 
central bank blamed the main regulatory agency (SUDEBAN), the regulatory agency 
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blamed the deposit insurance agency (FOGADE), and everyone else blamed the central 
bank. 6 
At the time of that crisis, the received wisdom was that such supervisory disarray 
could only happen in an emerging market; advanced economies had outgrown such 
chaos. We now know better. 
For starters, part of the supervisory responsibilities in the United States is 
delegated to the states, which is to say that 50 emerging markets agencies were partially 
responsible for the oversight of real estate lending.  Supervisors failed to caution 
depositories as they offered potential borrowers unsuitable mortgages.   They also 
acquiesced as complicated structures were booked off the balance sheet, even though, in 
the event, they were not treated as such by corporate headquarters at the first sign of 
stress.  And after the fact, they have pointed to the other guy as responsible for the 
problem.   
In the private sector, mortgage brokers often sought no more assurance of future 
repayment than a signature.  That act of faith was made easier because their own 
compensation owed to originating loans rather than how the loans played themselves out.  
And underwriters took that raw material of mortgages and somehow convinced 
themselves that the law of large numbers would make the whole better than the sum of its 
parts, even though many of those pieces needed double-digit house price growth to make 
economic sense.  Credit rating agencies, encouraged by their own fee structure, listened 
attentively to underwriters’ assurances of the power of pooling and their ability to predict 
despite a limited track record.  And final investors substituted the judgment of the rating 
                                                 
6 Superintendencia de Bancos y Otras Instituciones Financieras (SUDEBAN) ; Fondo de Garantías de 
Depósitos y Protección Bancaria (FOGADE) . 
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agencies for their own due diligence, perhaps abetted by regulation and accounting rules 
that imparted special significance to those judgments. 
No doubt, change is needed in both the private and public sectors.  My immediate 
fear is that, as in most prior episodes, the initial reaction will be overdone and inefficient.  
Financial institutions are already tightening the terms and standards for new lending at a 
ferocious clip.  Rating agencies, following their pro-cyclical tendencies, will overreact as 
well in the effort to distract the investing public from their laxness of the past few years 
by strict standards going forward. 7  Similarly, bank examiners will interpret the 
regulations narrowly, reinforcing the natural tendencies of depositories to tighten credit 
availability.   
And last but not least, politicians have already turned their focus toward the 
financial industry.  If the regulation of financial institutions needs to be revisited, there 
are compelling arguments to pare the multitude of regulators of depository institutions 
and insurance companies and to restructure the supervision of rating agencies. 8  But the 
outcome of hurried debate in the heat of the moment is more likely to be legislative 
overreach than informed policy making.  It would be far better to get the job done right 
than get the job done quickly. 
                                                 
7 See Carmen M. Reinhart (2002), “Sovereign Credit Ratings Before and After Financial Crises,”  and 
other chapters in Richard Levich, Giovanni Majnoni, and Carmen M. Reinhart, eds. Ratings, Rating 
Agencies and the Global Financial System, (New York: Kluwer Academic Press, 2002). 
8 See Richard Portes (2008) “Rating Agencies Reform” http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/887   
for an insightful discussion. 
